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GRANDMA GOT RUN OVER BY THE SUPREME COURT:
SUGGESTIONS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
NONPARENTAL VISITATION STATUTE AFTER TROXEL
v. GRANVILLE
Eric B. Martin
Abstract: Every state in the Union has a statute allowing for court-ordered child visitation
by non-parents. Until the summer of 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court had never ruled on the
constitutionality of such statutes. When the Court finally tackled Washington's statute in
Troxel v. Granville, the Court left the most significant questions unanswered, while casting
doubt on the validity of Washington's statute. Prior to Troxel, the Washington Supreme Court
had held Washington's nonparental visitation statute facially unconstitutional, finding that the
statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents. After granting certiorari, the
U.S. Supreme Court held Washington's statute unconstitutional as applied and refused to
reach the question of facial unconstitutionality. This Comment proposes three changes to
Washington's nonparental visitation statute that would ameliorate the objections voiced by the
U.S. Supreme Court regarding the application of the statute: the Washington Legislature
should limit the classes of persons allowed to petition for visitation, codify the common law
rebuttable presumption that a parent's decision regarding visitation is in the best interest of
the child, and add a purpose section to the nonparental visitation statute. This Comment
concludes that with these changes, Washington's nonparental visitation statute would be
constitutional and Washington's lower courts would have the guidance needed to constitu-
tionally apply the statute in a manner consistent with precedent.
Consider fourteen-year-old Riley. Riley's mother never got along with
her parents-in-law, but Riley and his father visited them frequently,
allowing Riley to develop strong emotional ties to those family members
and their ethnic and religious traditions.' Riley's father recently died.
Riley's mother now refuses her former in-laws permission to visit Riley.
Alternatively, imagine a nine-year-old boy named Royce. Royce has an
absentee father, who has never had any significant contact with his child.
From the time Royce was two, his mother lived with her boyfriend
Kevin, who served as a de facto parene to Royce. Recently, his mother
I. These scenarios are hypotheticals created by the author.
2 For purposes of this Comment, a de facto parent is a person who, while having no legal or
biological relationship to the child, has nonetheless acted as a parent to the child, usually while in a
relationship with one of the child's parents. De facto parents are increasingly common in homo-
sexual relationships in which one of the partners has a biological child, but the other partner has not
adopted, or legally cannot adopt, the child. See generally Recent Case, E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 711 N.E.2d
886 (Mass.), Cert. Denied, 120 S. Ct. 500 (1999), 113 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1999) [hereinafter
Recent Case]; see also In re B.G. v. San Bemardino County Welfare Dep't, 523 P.2d 244, 253 n. 18
(Cal. 1974).
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and Kevin separated for reasons unrelated to Royce. Kevin would like to
continue to see Royce and continue to provide him the parental guidance
he has provided up to this point in time. However, Royce's mother does
not want to see her ex-boyfriend and therefore will not allow Kevin to
spend time with her son. In the case of both Royce and Riley, continued
visitation with the non-parents would be in the best interest of the child.
In 1996, twenty-eight percent of U.S. children lived with only one
parent and four million children lived with their grandparents.3 People
outside the traditional nuclear family are increasingly involved in the
rearing of children.' In addition, although no state recognizes same-sex
marriages,5 an increasing number of same-sex partners are raising
children.6 Because one of the same-sex partners has no biological
relationship with the child, statutory law may prevent that partner from
adopting the child.' Finally, second marriages or subsequent non-marital
relationships are increasingly common.8 Often a stepparent does not
legally adopt children from a partner's or spouse's previous relationship,
perhaps because the child's other biological parent wishes to maintain a
legal relationship, or because the stepparent simply does not see the
value in completing the legal steps.
Until 1998, Washington law allowed a court to order visitation rights
for non-parents if such visitation would be in the best interest of the
child. However, a 1998 Washington Supreme Court holding, affirmed on
other grounds by a 2000 U.S. Supreme Court decision, raised serious
doubts regarding the law's validity.9
This Comment argues that the Washington State Legislature should
amend Washington's nonparental visitation statute by authorizing only
certain relatives and de facto parents to bring nonparental visitation
actions. Also, the Legislature should require courts to apply a rebuttable
3. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000) (to be published in U.S. Reports, summer
2001).
4. Id.; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 8-16 (1996).
5. But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1204 (2000) (providing for homosexual civil unions
similar to marriages).
6. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.5th 54, 61
(1995) (noting that same-sex adoption cases are "relatively recent" development).
7. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2059.
8. Id.
9. Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
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presumption that parental decisions regarding visitation are in the best
interest of their children. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of
the constitutional rights of parents, the tension between parental rights
and the state's parens patriae power, '° and the history of nonparental
visitation laws, in particular Washington's law. Part II explores the
conflict between the state's parens patriae power and the Constitutional
rights of parents. Further, it analyzes the holdings of the cases-In re
Smith in the Washington Supreme Court and Troxel v. Granville in the
U.S. Supreme Court-that questioned the continuing validity of
Washington's nonparental visitation law and explains the status of
current state law in light of these two cases. Part Ill argues that three
specific amendments to Washington's nonparental visitation statute
would address the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns in Troxel and allow
for the proper balance between the state's parens patriae power and
parents' constitutional rights. This Comment concludes that, with these
changes, Washington courts could constitutionally apply Washington's
nonparental visitation statute and not misinterpret precedent in light of
the Smith decision.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS, THE STATE'S
PARENS PATRIAE POWER, AND NONPARENTAL
VISITATION STATUTES
Parents' constitutional rights to control the upbringing of their
children are liberty interests derived from the Fourteenth Amendment."
However, these rights are not unlimited. While the line of cases
establishing parental rights is well-developed, the Court has not clearly
explained the extent to which a state, through its parenspatriae power to
act in its citizens' interests, may interfere with these rights.'2 Reconciling
these competing interests is necessary to evaluate properly nonparental
visitation statutes.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. The amendment reads in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Parental rights stem from
the liberty interest. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399-400 (1923).
12. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring).
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A. Parents Have a Limited Right To Raise Their Children Without
State Interference
It is beyond question that parents have some right to direct the
upbringing of their children. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed this principle since Meyer v. Nebraska3 in 1923. Yet the Court
has limited these rights by allowing state involvement in the welfare of
children where there is a compelling state interest since Prince v.
Massachusetts4 in 1944.
Parents' rights regarding the care and custody of their children are
well-established, 5 but these rights are not unlimited. The U.S. Supreme
Court articulated these rights in Meyer, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'6 and
subsequent cases. 7 In Meyer, the Court determined that the liberty
interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included at least a
partial right to raise children as a parent sees fit. 8 Invalidating a state law
prohibiting the teaching in schools of any language other than English,
the Court said that the liberty interest denoted freedom "to engage in any
of the common occupations of life.... [including bringing] up
children."' 9 Similarly, in Pierce, the Court held unconstitutional a statute
requiring children to attend only public schools because it unreasonably
interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
development of their children.2" In striking down the law, the Court noted
that constitutional rights may not be abridged by legislation that has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the state's regulatory
competence.2
However, in Prince, the Court held that the family is not beyond state
regulation.22 While responsibility for "custody, care and nurture" resides
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
15. See Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 13, 969 P.2d at 27.
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. See Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparent's Visitation
Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 125-26 (1986); see also Wash. State Coalition for the Homeless
v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wash. 2d 894, 929-32, 949 P.2d 1291, 1309-10 (1997).
18. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
19. Id. at 399.
20. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 520; see also Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the
Parent Refuse?, 24J. FAM. L. 393, 410 (1985).
21. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 520.
22. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
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first in the parents of the child, the state has authority in matters affecting
a child's welfare and thus has a broad range of powers to limit parental
freedom and authority in those areas.' In Prince, the Court upheld an
application of Massachusetts's child-labor law prohibiting girls under
eighteen years of age from selling publications (here religious literature)
on the streets.24 Rejecting assertions of parental control and free exercise
of religion, the Court held that the state's power to protect the child from
harm does not depend on the presence or direction of the child's
guardian.' The Court did not discuss the exact parameters of the state's
power to intrude into parental rights and religious freedom.26 Regarding
the limits of state power, the Court held only that "the rightful boundary
of [the state's] power has not been crossed in this case" 27 and noted that
"[o]ur ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents."'2
In later cases, the Court described the liberty interest as applying to
the family unit instead of strictly to parents. In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,29 a case involving living arrangements, the Court noted that:
[O]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition.... Even if
conditions of modem society have brought about a decline in
extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated
wisdom of civilization.., that supports a larger conception of the
family.30
Similarly, in Quilloin v. Walcott,3" the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the




26. After noting the "custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," the Court
went on to hold that "neither rights of religion nor rights ofparenthood are beyond limitation... the
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare." Id. at 166-67 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 170.
28. Id. at 171.
29. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
30. Id. at 504-05.
31. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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child, even though there was no finding that the father was unfit or that
the child suffered harm from the parental relationship. 2 Quilloin
involved the termination of a biological father's parental rights in order
to allow for the adoption of the child by the child's stepfather.33 The
stepfather had been involved in the child's life for eleven years and was
married to the child's mother, while the father had taken little or no
interest in the child and had never married the child's mother.34 Likewise
in Lehr v. Robertson," the Court noted that a parent's liberty interests do
not "spring full-blown from the biological connection between the parent
and child. They require relationships more enduring."36
B. The State's Parens Patriae Power Allows for Regulation of Child
Welfare
The parens patriae doctrine allows a state to protect its quasi-
sovereign interests in the "health, comfort, and welfare of its citizens."37
The doctrine ofparens patriae, literally "parent of the country,"38 comes
from English common law.39 Originally, the monarch assumed this role
to act as a guardian for minors, incompetents,40 and those 'who have no
other protector.""'4 States have used this authority to pursue environ-
mental, antitrust, and mass tort litigation, such as tobacco suits on behalf
of citizens.42 This authority is also used to pursue child-welfare cases.4 3
The state's parens patriae power thus fits within the state's police power
"to regulate public health and safety, maintain the peace, and provide for
the general welfare."
32. Id. at 255-56.
33. Id. at 257.
34. Id.
35. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
36. Id. at 260.
37. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1847 (2000).
38. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century:
Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381,381 (2000).
39. See Ratliff, supra note 37, at 1850.
40. See Clark, supra note 38, at 382.
41. See id. (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 445 (2d ed. 1968)).
42. See Ratliff, supra note 37, at 1848-49.
43. Clark, supra note 38, at 382; see also Ratliff, supra note 37, at 1847.
44. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The
Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 857 (2000).
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Parens patriae is the most common basis for state involvement in
child-custody disputes.45 In In re Sumey,4 the Washington Supreme
Court upheld the temporary residential placement of a child outside the
home as a valid exercise of the state'sparenspatriae power, even though
there was no assertion of parental unfitness or harm to the child.47
Similarly, in In re Welfare of Key,48 the court upheld the state's parens
patriae power to hold a dependency hearing over the objection of the
child's mother.49 The court stated that the interest of the mother did not
turn on her fitness, rather that "presence or absence of unfitness would
seem to affect only the weight of the State's interest."5 Even in child-
custody decisions, courts exercise the parens patriae power to make
decisions based on the best interests of the child.5 ' Thus, although the
right to custody, care, and nurturing of children resides first in their
parents,s2 parents' power must give way to the child's best interest when
the state exercises itsparenspatriae powers.53
The Washington Supreme Court has utilized parens patriae power in
holding that the family is not beyond regulation in the public interest.
The state utilizes a wide range of parens patriae power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in matters affecting a child's welfare.54
The Washington Supreme Court held in Sumey that:
[T]he liberty and privacy protections of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment establish a parental constitutional right
to the care, custody, and companionship of the child.... The
parents' constitutional rights, however, do not afford an absolute
protection against State interference with the family relation-
ship... [g]rowing concern for the welfare of the child and the
disappearance of the concept of the child as property has led to a
gradual modification in judicial attitude. It is now well established
45. See William M. Hilton, Parens Patriae or the Jurisdictional Brick Wall, 21 WHITTIER L. REv.
231,233 (1999).
46. 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).
47. Id. at 762-65,621 P.2d at 110-12.
48. 119 Wash. 2d 600,836 P.2d 200 (1992).
49. Id. at 610-13, 836 P.2d at 206-07.
50. Id. at 611,836 P.2d at 206.
51. See In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 646,626 P.2d 16,22 (1981).
52. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
53. In re Cooper, 631 P.2d 632, 637 (Kan. 1981).
54. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
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that when parental actions or decisions seriously conflict with the
physical or mental health of the child, the state has a parens patriae
right and responsibility to intervene to protect the child.5
Similarly, in State v. Koome,5 6 the court recognized that "although the
family structure is a fundamental institution of our society, and parental
prerogatives are entitled to considerable legal deference ... they are not
absolute and must yield to fundamental rights of the child or important
interests of the State."57 The concept is again found in In re K.R.,58 where
the court accepted the application of the state's parens patriae power to
terminate parental rights without requiring an explicit finding of parental
unfitness. 9 The court60 stated that "when the rights of parents and the
welfare of their children are in conflict, the welfare of the minor children
must prevail.'
C. The History ofNonparental Visitation Laws and Washington's
Nonparental Visitation Statute
At common law, no legal right for nonparental visitation existed.
However, every state has enacted some sort of nonparental visitation
statute.62 While the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
limits of parents' constitutional rights in the context of nonparental
visitation statutes,63 the majority of state courts addressing the issue has
55. In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108, 110 (1980) (internal citations and quota-
tion marks omitted).
56. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
57. Id. at 907, 530 P.2d at 264.
58. 128 Wash. 2d 129, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995).
59. Id. at 146, 904 P.2d at 1141 (Madsen, J.).
60. The In re K.R. opinion was authored by Justice Madsen, who also authored the court's
opinion in Smith. Id.; Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1,969 P.2d 21, q/7'don other grounds
sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
61. In re K.R., 28 Wash. 2d at 146, 904 P.2d at 1141.
62. While most statutes address grandparent visitation, some statutes allow for other nonparental
visitation, including visitation by other relatives, non-relatives who have significant relationships
with the child, including de facto parents, and, in the case of Washington's statute, "any person." See
generally Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to
the Best Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 387 (1977). While there may be different policy
questions raised by the different statutes, the constitutional questions remain the same regardless of
the parties permitted to petition for visitation. This Comment uses the term "nonparental visitation"
to refer to all of these types of statutes.
63. See infra Part II.D.1.
Vol. 76:571, 2001
Nonparental Visitation Rights
found these statutes comport with the federal constitutional protections
given to the liberty and privacy interests.6
1. Nonparental Visitation Under the Common Law
At common law, grandparents and other non-parents generally had no
legal right to petition for visitation with children that were not their
own. 61 Society recognized a grandparent's right to visitation with a child
"as the custodial parent's moral obligation, but not an enforceable legal
right."'66 The few exceptions to the common law rule were based on a
custodial parent's voluntary relinquishment of exclusive control over the
child.67 As a result, those seeking visitation had no legal recourse other
than to challenge the fitness of the parent.68 If the custodial parent was
found to be a fit parent, the party seeking visitation had to accept the
decision of the parent.69 The common law rule resulted in an ironic
situation that made it easier to sue for custody of children, because that
decision was predicated on the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard, than
to petition for visitation, where the decision was based on the stricter
"harm-to-the-child" standard.
70
64. See infra Part II.A.
65. See Timothy Collins, Note, Grandparents'Statutory Right to Petition for Visitation: Vermont
and the National Framework, 10 VT. L. REV. 55,57 (1985).
66. Sharon F. Ladd, Note, Tennessee Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents and the Best
Interests of the Child, 15 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 635, 635 (1985).
67. See Collins, supra note 65, at 59; see also Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed,
Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U. L.. 643 (1979):
Exception to the usual common law rule is made in three instances: (1) when there was an
agreement or stipulation as to visitation made, for example, incident to a divorce proceeding; (2)
when the child has resided with the person seeking visitation, as for example, in a case in which,
the child's custody originally having been awarded to a parent who lived with grandparents, the
custodial parent died and the surviving parent seeks a change of custody; and (3) when it is
demonstrated that the parent seeking custody is "unfit" under the prevailing notions at the time.
Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
68. Borzi, supra note 62, at 387.
69. See id.
70. See Foster & Freed, supra note 67, at 647.
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2. Nonparental Visitation Statutes
In the late 1960s, state legislatures, seeking to provide visitation rights
to grandparents, relatives, stepparents, de facto parents,71 and others,
began to enact nonparental visitation statutes.72 Currently all fifty states
have some form of nonparental visitation statute.73 These statutes
commonly give trial courts the discretion to award visitation rights to
non-parents after a showing that it would be in the best interest of the
child to do so. 74 Many states limit the jurisdiction of the court to certain
circumstances such as divorce, death of a parent, or other pending
custody or visitation action.75 Many states also limit who may bring
nonparental visitation actions to, for example, grandparents or other
blood relatives, de facto parents, or stepparents. 76
71. For a definition of"de facto parent" see supra note 2.
72. See Borzi, supra note 62, at 392.
73. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3104 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-59 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West
Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(7) (Michie 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7.1 (West 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-129 (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, §§ 1801-1805 (West 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 119, § 39(D) (Law. Co-op.
2000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(7b) (Michie 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West Supp.
2000); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-16-3 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West Supp. 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1802 (Michie 1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 125C.050 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-17-d (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72
(McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.11 (Anderson 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West Supp. 2001);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5312 (West Supp. 1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1 to -24.3 (Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-52 to -54 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302
(1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 200 1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp.
2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.2, 20-124.1
(Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160(3) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2B-3 to -6
(Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101
(Michie 1999).
74. See Borzi, supra note 62, at 392.
75. See Ladd, supra note 66, at 639; see also Collins, supra note 65, at 61.
76. See Stephen Hellman, The Child, The Step Parent, and the State: Step Parent Visitation and
the Voice of the Child, 16 TOURO L. REV. 45 (1999).
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Washington has two nonparental visitation statutes.77 The one at issue
in Smith and Troxel allows for visitation petitions to be brought by "any
person" at "any time" so long as it is in the "best interest of the child."7'
The other statute allows for a petition for visitation only upon a divorce
proceeding, and requires that the judge make a determination that
visitation would be in the "best interest of the child."79 However, the
visitation statue at issue in Smith and Troxel provides no guidance for
trial courts to use in determining the best interest of the child. In contrast,
a trial court using the divorce statute is guided by several statutory
factors:
(a) The strength of the relationship between the child and the
petitioner;
(b) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the
person with whom the child is residing and the petitioner;
(c) The nature and reason for either parent's objection to granting
the petitioner visitation;
(d) The effect that granting visitation will have on the relationship
between the child and the child's parents or the person with
whom the child is residing;
(e) The residential time sharing arrangements between the
parents;
(f) The good faith of the petitioner;
(g) Any criminal history or history of physical, emotional, or
sexual abuse or neglect by the petitioner; and
(h) Any other factor relevant to the child's best interest.80
When the Washington Supreme Court was presented with the Smith case,
it confronted not the divorce statute, but the other nonparental visitation
statute. The court sought to reconcile parental constitutional rights and
the state's parens patriae power.
77. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.240, .10.160.
78. Id. § 26.10.160(3) ("Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any
person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any
change in circumstances"); Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 969 P.2d 21, 23 affd on
other grounds sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2057 (2000).
79. WAH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240(6).
80. Id.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WASHINGTON'S
NONPARENTAL VISITATION STATUTE UNDER THE SMITH
AND TROXEL DECISIONS
At the heart of the constitutional question regarding nonparental
visitation statutes is the inherent conflict between the constitutional
rights of parents and the parens patriae power of the state. The
Washington Supreme Court, in three consolidated cases, bucked the
trend of other state courts and held in Smith v. Stillwell-Smith that
Washington's nonparental visitation statute facially violated the U.S.
Constitution.8 The U.S. Supreme Court, without a majority opinion,
affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Troxel, but only as
applied.8" In Troxel, the Court did not rule on the facial constitutionality
of the interpretation given the statue by the Washington Supreme Court.83
The constitutionality of nonparental visitation statutes therefore remains
unaddressed by the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality.
A. State Court Reactions to Nonparental Visitation Statutes
While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to truly weigh in on the matter,
a majority of the states faced with the question have framed the primary
issue presented by nonparental visitation statutes as the tension between
the state's parens patriae power and a parent's constitutional rights
regarding child rearing.84 Nonparental visitation statutes have generally
met with acceptance by state courts.85 The majority view accepts non-
parental visitation statutes that are premised on the best interests of the
child.86
8 1. See Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 5, 969 P.2d at 23.
82. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
83. Id.
84. See Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 28-30, 969 P.2d at 34-35 (1998) (Talmadge, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
85. See, e.g., Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Sightes v. Barker, 684
N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1997); Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Spradling v.
Harris, 778 P.2d 365 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992); Herndon v.
Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1985); People ex reL
Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981); Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.
App. 1975); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); In re Richardson, No. HK
1364-A, 2000 WL 869450 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2000).
86. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 631-32.
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The few courts that have held nonparental visitation statutes unconsti-
tutional have done so on state constitutional grounds.8 7 For example, in
Beagle v. Beagle,8 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the state's
nonparental visitation statutes violated the enhanced privacy rights found
in article 1, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which provides
privacy protections "broader in scope" than the U.S. Constitution. 9
However, Washington's constitution affords no greater protection than
the protections provided by the U.S. Constitution on matters of privacy,
other than in the area of search and seizure."
B. State Court Proceedings in Smith v. Stillwell-Smith
The Washington Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Stillwell-Smith
is the result of three consolidated, somewhat typical,9' nonparental
visitation actions.92 Clay v. Wolcott93 involved the former male compan-
ion of the mother of a six-year-old boy.94 The man had developed a close
relationship with the child while living with the child's mother for the
child's second through sixth years of life.95 In Smith v. Stillwell-Smith,
the parents of a child had filed for divorce.96 While the divorce was
pending, the maternal grandmother of the child shot and killed her son-
in-law.97 The father's surviving family petitioned for visitation with his
child.98 In In re Visitation ofTroxel,9 Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel
87. See, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996); Hoffv. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.
1999); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). But cf Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769
(Ga. 1995).
88. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
89. Id. at 1275-76.
90. Ramm v. City of Seattle, 66 Wash. App. 15, 27, 830 P.2d 395, 402 (1992); see also WASH.
CONsT. art. I, § 7.
91. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (No. 99-138),
available at 1999 WL 1079965 (citing more than 700 reported cases).
92 Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21 '(1998), af'd on other grounds sub
nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
93. 85 Wash. App. 468, 933 P.2d 1066 (1997).




98. Id. at 7, 969 P.2d at 24.
99. 87 Wash. App. 131, 940 P.2d 698 (1997).
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had a long-term relationship that resulted in two daughters."° The couple
separated in 1991. "' At that time, Brad Troxel moved in with his parents
Jenifer and Gary Troxel.102 In 1993, two years after the separation, Brad
Troxel committed suicide. 3 His parents continued to see their
granddaughters on a regular basis after the death of their son."
However, in October 1993, Ms. Granville informed them that she wished
to limit their visitation with her daughters. 1"5 The Troxels responded by
filing a petition for visitation under Washington's nonparental visitation
statute1°6 in county superior court. 17 The trial court found that visitation
was in the best interest of the children and issued an order granting the
Troxels visitation.1
0 8
In a five-to-four decision, the Washington State Supreme Court held
that Washington's relevant nonparental visitation statute ' 9 was contrary
to the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, it held the
statute facially unconstitutional."' The court relied primarily on the
Meyer-Pierce line of cases describing the scope of parents' constitutional
rights."' The court held that a parent's fundamental right to autonomy in
child-rearing decisions is unassailable absent a showing of harm to the
child."' Likewise, it held that the state cannot invoke its parens patriae
power absent a showing of parental unfitness or harm to the child."3 The
court held that the only compelling state interests authorizing state
intrusion on family life were protecting citizens from threats to health or
safety or from injuries inflicted by third persons." 4 Thus, the decision, in
addition to invalidating the statute, rejected as unconstitutional the best-






106. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000).
107. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 5-6, 969 P.2d at 23-24.
108. Id.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3).
110. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 5, 969 P.2d at 23.
Ill. See id. at 13-18, 969 P.2d at 27-29; supra Part I.A.
112. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 19, 969 P.2d at 30.




interest-of-the-child standard and thus sharply limited theparenspatriae
power of the state.
In addressing theparenspatriae power of the state, the court held that
there must first be harm to the child before the state may exercise this
power."' It attempted to distinguish its previous holding in In re
Sumey." 6 That case held that the state need not demonstrate unfitness of
a parent before exercising its parens patriae power but instead must
weigh the interest of the state action against the intrusion on the parent's
rights." 7 The Smith court declined to use the Sumey balancing test,
believing that the proper standard was only whether, absent visitation,
there was harm to the children."' While this standard contradicted the
precedent of Sumey, the Smith court indicated that the statute in question
in Sumey involved potential harm to children." 9 While suggesting that
the Sumey court improperly used the balancing test, the court went on to
find that "[n]evertheless, the court's result was correct because the
interests of the state in that case ... were compelling and the statute was
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest."' 20 This odd sidestep
around the Sumey balancing test gave rise to the dissent's major
disagreement with Smith.
Writing for a four-justice dissent, Justice Talmadge condemned the
decision's "cruel and far-reaching effects on loving relatives.' 2' The
dissent contended that the majority opinion misinterpreted the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinions dealing with parental rights." In addition, the
dissent questioned the majority's reliance on cases that involved other
substantial infringements of parental or others' rights.' The dissent
argued that the rights of parents are not unlimited and that "the state has
a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
115. See id.
116. 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).
117. Id. at 763-65, 621 P.2dat 111-12.
118. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 19,969 P.2d at 30.
119. Id. at 19 n.4, 969 P.2d at 30 n.4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 23, 969 P.2d at 32 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
122. Id. (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 26-27, 969 P.2d at 33-34 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(discussing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination of parental rights); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise of religious beliefs); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (termination of parental rights); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that
parental authority to send children to private religious or military schools is otherwise acceptable)).
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things affecting the child's welfare."' 24 The dissent further averred that
Sumey was controlling and that its balancing test was appropriate. 25
C. Standards of Review Used in Reviewing State Nonparental
Visitation Statutes
When the U.S. Supreme Court reviews a challenge to a state statute
based on the U.S. Constitution, the state's highest court and the U.S.
Supreme Court have combined responsibility for resolving the issue.2 6
The state court interprets the statute in question, and the U.S. Supreme
Court rules on the constitutionality of that statute as interpreted.
2 7
However, even if the U.S. Supreme Court holds a statute as interpreted
by the state supreme court unconstitutional, either facially or as applied,
the state court may salvage the statute by either reconsidering the
interpretation or severing the statute's unconstitutional language. 28
The Court applies a strict scrutiny test when analyzing state legislation
that may interfere with a family's liberty interest. 29 In order to survive
strict scrutiny, the state government must show a compelling state
interest in the area encompassed by the legislation. 3 ° In addition, the
state must narrowly tailor legislation to obtain the results desired by the
legislation and cause minimal infringement on fundamental rights.'
D. The U.S. Supreme Court's Holdings in Troxel v. Granville
In Troxel, the Supreme Court accepted review of one of the three
cases ruled on in Smith. The Court affirmed the Washington Supreme
124. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
125. See Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 23, 969 P.2d at 32 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
126. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
283-84 (1994).
127. Id. at 284.
128. Id.
129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,233
(1972) (analyzing family rights in First Amendment context).
130. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
131. Id. Additionally, the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation rights turns on
the specific manner in which that standard is applied. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064
(2000). The constitutional protections in this area are best elaborated with care. Id. Because much
state court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, the U.S. Supreme Court
should be hesitant to hold specific nonparental visitation statutes per se unconstitutional. See id.
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Court, finding the statute unconstitutional, but only as applied.' The
Court specifically refused to rule on the facial constitutionality of the
Washington statute.' While the Court's six opinions (three concurring,
three dissenting) did not resolve the question of the constitutionality of
nonparental visitation statutes, 34 two overriding principles may be
gleaned from the opinions. Specifically, the Court indicated that the class
of people allowed to bring nonparental visitation actions should be
limited 35 and that courts must give parents a rebuttable presumption that
their decisions with respect to visitation are in their child's best
interest. 1
36
1. The Court's Opinions in Troxel v. Granville
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel arrived in six separate
opinions. 13 Justice O'Connor wrote the lead opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.38 Justices Souter
and Thomas each concurred in the judgment and filed separate
opinions. 39 Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy each dissented and
filed separate opinions."4 The Court held Washington's nonparental
visitation statute unconstitutional only as applied to Tommie Granville in
In re Visitation of Troxel.'4' The four'justices represented by the
O'Connor opinion declined to reach the question of whether a finding of
harm is required prior to a court's granting visitation to non-parents. 42
Justice Souter believed the statute was unconstitutional on its face due to
its overbreadth. "13 Justice Thomas concluded that nonparental visitation
was not a compelling state interest, and therefore, beyond the state's
parens patriae power to regulate.'" Because these opinions sweep
132. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Seeid. at 2060-61.
136. See id. at 2062.




141. Id. at 2064.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 2065-67 (Souter, J., concurring). .,
144. See id. at 2067-68 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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broader than the O'Connor opinion, the plurality opinion is the narrowest
opinion, and therefore the holding of the court.'45
2. Guidance Gleaned From the Troxel Opinions
While the Troxel Court refused to address whether Washington's
nonparental visitation statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Troxel opinions provides several clues as to how the Court may treat
nonparental visitation statutes in the future. Any future nonparental
visitation statute must address two principle concerns raised by the U.S.
Supreme Court opinions.
First, the O'Connor plurality and Souter concurrence questioned the
"breathtakingly broad"'46 sweep of the Washington statute. On its face,
the statute allows for "any person" to petition for visitation at "any
time."'47 The Washington Supreme Court interpreted this language
strictly,'48 seemingly construing it to mean that complete strangers could
petition to visit children.'49 Indeed, Washington's statute appears to be
the only statute with such broad language. 50 Five Justices noted this
breadth and found it troublesome.'
5
'
Second, several of the justices' decisions emphasized the level of
deference accorded to a parental decision. The O'Connor plurality
opined that the record in Troxel demonstrated that the trial court merely
substituted its judgment for the judgment of an otherwise fit parent.' In
fact, the trial court appeared to apply a presumption in favor of
nonparental visitation.' Citing Parham v. JR., 54 the U.S. Supreme
145. When lower courts face fractured decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court has
decreed the use of the "Marks rule," derived from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Under the Marks rule, when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430
U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
and Stevens, JJ.)). Washington courts have adopted the Marks rule. See State v. Zakel, 61 Wash.
App. 805, 808, 812 P.2d 512, 514 (1991) (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).




150. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (2000), with statutes cited in supra note 73.
151. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061 (opinion of O'Connor, J.), 2066 (Souter, J., concurring).




Court stated that so long as a parent is fit, there is ordinarily no reason
for the state to inject itself into the private realm of the family."' 5 The
plurality noted that the problem was not the fact that the trial court
intervened in the parental decision,'56 but that the court granted no
deference to the parental decision.'57 Dissenting Justices Stevens... and
Kennedy" 9 shared this concern, bringing the total to six justices,.
Nevertheless, the Troxel case leaves Washington and other states
without explicit guidance as to whether nonparental visitation statutes are
constitutional, and if so, what elements they require."6 Thus, the
Washington Supreme Court may feel constrained to follow its previous
decision in Smith, or it may re-evaluate that holding based on the
guidance (albeit limited) gleaned from the U.S. Supreme Court's Troxel
decision. 6'
III. THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND ITS
NONPARENTAL VISITATION STATUTE
To ensure that Washington courts fulfill the Legislature's intent, and,
more important, to guarantee that courts apply the staiute constitu-
tionally, the Legislature should amend, Washington's nonparental
visitation statute. To address the concerns that the U.S. Supreme Court
voiced in Troxel v. Granville,62 the amendments should (1) specifically
limit the class of persons permitted to petition for nonparental visitation
to relatives and de facto parents, (2) codify a rebuttable presumption that
a parental decision regarding visitation is in the best interest of the child,
154. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
155. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061.
156. Id. at 2062.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 2075-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See Philip Talmadge, Grandparent Visitation Rulings Leave Unanswered Questions, WASH.
B. NEWS, Sept. 2000, at 30.
161. Because this Comment argues that the Legislature should amend the statute, it need neither
address nor resolve this issue. However, it should be noted that every state that has considered
nonparental visitation in light of Troxel has upheld the visitation statute as constitutional. See
Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Lopez v. Martinez, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d
1087 (Md. 2000); In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717
N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
162. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
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and (3) articulate a purpose to guide courts in interpreting the amended
statute.
The proposed amendments would address the constitutional concerns
of the U.S. Supreme Court while recognizing the importance of non-
traditional families and protecting the best interests of the child. The
rebuttable presumption that a parental decision is in the best interest of
the child has already been implicitly approved by the Court.
163
Furthermore, the amendments would properly balance the rights of
parents and the parens patriae power of the state and ensure that
Washington courts would properly apply existing precedent. Should the
Washington Legislature adopt the proposed amendments, the resulting
statute would be facially constitutional and would provide courts the
guidance necessary to apply the statute constitutionally.
A. The Washington Legislature Should Amend the Nonparental
Visitation Statute To Comport with Constitutional Requirements
To bring the statute in line with constitutional requirements and to
ensure that courts constitutionally apply Washington's nonparental
visitation statute, the Legislature should make three amendments. First,
the Legislature should limit the class of persons who may petition for
visitation. Second, the Legislature should mandate a rebuttable presump-
tion that a parent's determination regarding visitation is in the best
interest of the child. Finally, the Legislature should add an intent section
to give interpretive guidance to the courts.
1. The Amended Statute Should Limit the Class of Persons Who May
Petition for Visitation
Both to address the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns with the
"breathtakingly broad '" scope of Washington's statute and to maintain
the purpose of the nonparental visitation statute, the Washington
Legislature should amend the "any person" language of the statute. It
should narrowly define the phrase "any person," which occurs twice in
the statute,16 as "a relative or de facto parent."
163. See id. at 2061.
164. Id.
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000).
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The first class of persons who should be allowed to petition for
visitation is the child's relatives. For purposes of the statute, the
Legislature should define "relative" as a "grandparent, aunt, uncle, or
sibling." Most nonparental visitation statutes were originally enacted to
address visitation by grandparents." Indeed, several state statutes
address only visitation by grandparent or other relatives. 67 This class of
persons would include those who make up contemporary extended
families, thereby recognizing the importance of family relations.
The second class of people who could seek visitation rights under the
amended statute would be de facto parents. The Legislature should
define a de facto parent as "any person who, while having no biological
or other legal relationship to the child, has nonetheless acted as a parent
to the child." 6' This category of people would include stepparents who
have not adopted their stepchildren and unmarried partners who have
acted as parents, including same-sex parents with no biological or legal
relationship with the child. In some circumstances, these de facto parents
are legally barred from adoption, either because of their same-sex
status 169 or because the biological parent is alive and refuses permis-
sion.7 ° These amendments would create two limited classes of persons
with the ability to bring visitation actions, 7 ' classes that are not
"breathtakingly broad."
2. The Amended Statute Should Require Trial Courts To Apply a
Rebuttable Presumption that a Fit Parent's Decisions Are in the
Best Interest of the Child
The second proposed amendment would require trial courts to
presume that a fit parent's decision regarding visitation is in the best
interest of the child. In Smith, the Washington Supreme Court did not
166. See Shandling, supra note 17, at 119.
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West Supp. 1984), S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-
420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
168. See Recent Case, supra note 2; see also In re B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Dep't,
523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974).
169. See Sonja Larson, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.5th 54
(1995).
170. See, e.g., In re A.S., 65 Wash. App. 631, 634-36, 829 P.2d 791, 792-93 (1992). See
generally WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.160.
171. Consistent with current practice, these sections would be severable in order to protect the
statute if any part of the statute was found to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit
Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 228, 11 P.3d 762,791 (2000).
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require trial courts to adopt the traditional common law presumption1 2
that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.7 3 In order
to reverse this interpretation, the Legislature should add a new section to
Washington's nonparental visitation statute: "In any action arising under
this section, the trial court shall apply a rebuttable presumption that a
parent's decisions regarding visitation are in the best interest of the
child."'174 The Legislature should further amend the statute to provide
guidance to the courts in determining the best interests of the child when
the petitioner attempts to rebut the parental determination. The
Legislature should provide this guidance by adopting the standards found
in Washington's other nonparental visitation statute.' The proposed
standards section would read:
The court may consider the following factors when making a
determination of the child's best interests:
(a) The strength of the relationship between the child and the
petitioner;
(b) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the
person with whom the child is residing and the petitioner;
(c) The nature and reason for either parent's objection to granting
the petitioner visitation;
(d) The effect that granting visitation will have on the relationship
between the child and the child's parents or the person with
whom the child is residing;
(e) The residential time sharing arrangements between the
parents;
(f) The good faith of the petitioner;
(g) Any criminal history or history of physical, emotional, or
sexual abuse or neglect by the petitioner; and
172. Arguably, in doing so the court may have abrogated its duty to interpret statutes in a
constitutional manner and to avoid absurd or strained results. See State ex reL. Evergreen Freedom
Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 615 Wash. 2d 615, 632, 999 P.2d 602, 612 (2000).
173. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000).
174. In adopting this section, the Washington State Legislature would be overruling the
interpretation the Washington Supreme Court gave to the existing nonparental visitation statute. The
Legislature would not be overruling the court's determination that a specific interpretation of the
statute is unconstitutional. The authority of the Legislature to act in this manner is well-accepted.
See, e.g., Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Wash. State Human Rts. Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39
Wash. App. 609, 612-17, 694 P.2d 697, 699-700 (1985).




(h) Any other factor relevant to the child's best interest. 76
3. The Legislature Should Add an Appropriate Purpose Section to
Washington's Nonparental Visitation Statute To Guide Courts in
Interpreting the Statute
The Washington Legislature should also provide guidance to the state
courts in interpreting the nonparental visitation statute by adding a
purpose section to the statute. A purpose section would provide guidance
to courts for interpreting any part of the statute that might be vague. The
section should set forth the Legislature's three underlying policies in
enacting the statute: (1) parents have a right to control who visits their
children; (2) visitation with other adults is often desirable and beneficial
to children; and (3) in order to obtain visitation with a child against a
parent's will, a petitioner must affirmatively demonstrate that it would be
in the best interest of the child.
B. The Proposed Amendments Would Address the U.S. Supreme
Court's Concern that the Statute Is "Breathtakingly Broad"
The proposed amendments would meet the constitutional require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment because they address the U.S.
Supreme Court's concerns that the statute is "breathtakingly broad.""'
The Washington Supreme Court held that the nonparental visitation
statute was unambiguous, and therefore read no qualifications into the
"any person" language.' While this treatment was suspect, 7 9 under the
rules of review 8' the U.S. Supreme Court had to analyze this
interpretation.'' Under the proposed amended statute, only two distinct
classes of people would be permitted to bring visitation actions: relatives
176. This is identical to the standard found in WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240(6).
177. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061.
178. See Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 969 P.2d 21, 26 (1998), a fd on other
grounds sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
179. The court could have read the language in conjunction with the requirement that the
visitation be in the best interest of the child, or in the greater context of child custody and visitation
to limit the class of persons with standing to petition for visitation. This would have been consistent
with the court's duty to avoid absurd or strained consequences. See State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom
Found. v. Wash. Edue. Ass'n, 615 Wash. 2d 615, 632, 999 P.2d 602,612 (2000); see also supra Part
II.B.
180. See infra Part III.C.
181. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2065.
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and de facto parents. The amended statute would necessarily exclude a
stranger from petitioning for visitation.
8 2
These classes would be in line with the cases that indicate that child
visitation is a family right.'83 The U.S. Supreme Court has long rejected
the notion that a family is constitutionally defined as being only
comprised of parents and their children.'84 Such cases suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not favor parental claims over those of
other family members."18 This distinction is particularly significant in the
majority of nonparental visitation cases, which involve either relatives or
de facto parents, both of whom courts could consider family members.'86
The U.S. Supreme Court, in other contexts, has extended family
protections to grandparents, 87 aunts and nieces, 88 and de facto parents.1
8 9
The proposed statute would narrow the class of people permitted to
petition for visitation consistent with the fact that a parent's right with
respect to total strangers is not identical to the interest with respect to
others such as de facto parents. 190
Furthermore, the proposed amendment would address Justice
Kennedy's concern that a traditional family with two or even one
permanent and caring parent is not a reality for many children.,' It also
addresses Justice Stevens's concern with protecting the child's interest in
preserving relationships that serve the child's welfare and protection.'9 2
De facto parents have an important connection to their de facto children
and may have a significant positive impact on these children's lives.'
93
Thus, the proposed amendment would allow for the protection of the
interests of the child in maintaining significant relationships'94 and would
182. There are no reported cases in which a stranger has petitioned for visitation with a child.
183. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see also Bean, supra note 20, at 419-20.
184. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-02 (1977).
185. See Toni Eddy, Comment, Grandparent Visitation Rights in Ohio When the Family is Intact,
28 CAP. U. L. REV. 197,203-04 (1999).
186. Cases like Quilloin, while weakening protection given to biological parents, arguably
strengthen the protection given to the extended family. See Bean, supra note 20, at 417-18.
187. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06.
188. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
189. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989).
190. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2077-78 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 104-09.
194. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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encompass a broad concept of family.'95 Yet, by limiting the classes to
those implicitly approved by U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the
amendment would satisfy the "breathtakingly broad" concerns voiced by
the O'Connor plurality. 1
96
C. The Proposed Amendments Would Address the U.S. Supreme
Court's Concern Regarding Deference to Parents by Codifying the
Existing Common Law Presumption in Favor ofParental Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously recognized a presumption that
a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. 7 The trial
court's failure to adopt this common law presumption (and the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's failure to require the presumption) was one of the
two major concerns of the justices in Troxel.' 8 The proposed amendment
would require courts to apply a rebuttable presumption that the decisions
of the parents are in the best interest of the child. This amendment would
also bring Washington in line with the majority of other states'
nonparental visitation statutes.'"
After reviewing the record, the O'Connor plurality determined that the
trial court merely substituted its determination of the best interest of the
children without giving any deference to the parental decision."'
According to the O'Connor plurality, this decision directly contravened
the traditional presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
children.2"' As the Court explained in Parham, it has been historically
recognized that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children." 0 2 The proposed amendment would codify the
common law presumption, removing the potential for trial courts to
195. See id. at 2059.
196. Id. at 2061.
197. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
198. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2061-62.
199. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (West 1994) (codifying rebuttable presumption that
grandparent visitation is not in child's best interest if parents agree that visitation should not be
granted); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (requiring that visitation not
significantly interfere with parent-child relationship or with parent's authority over child); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(V) (Supp. 1999) (codifying rebuttable presumption that parent's decision to
refuse visitation was reasonable).
200. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2062.
201. Id.; see also, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
202. Troxel, 120 S. CL at 2061 (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).
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interpret the statute in the manner adopted by the Smith court. The
amendment would obviate Justice Souter's opinion that the Washington
Supreme Court's controlling interpretation rejecting deference to
parental decisions rendered the statute unconstitutional.203 By employing
a rebuttable presumption, the amendment would allow courts to constitu-
tionally award visitation to foster parents and other caregivers, as
advocated by Justice Stevens.
2 4
D. The Proposed Amendments Would Ensure Courts Will Apply
Washington 's Nonparental Visitation Statute Constitutionally by
Properly Balancing the State's Parens Patriae Power with the
Constitutional Rights of Parents
The Legislature should amend the nonparental visitation statute to
avoid the Washington Supreme Court's poor reasoning in Smith and
provide clear guidance to lower courts applying the statute to balance
constitutionally the state's parens patriae power and parental rights.
Prior to Smith, in assessing the constitutionality of an infringement on a
parent's rights, Washington courts sought the proper balance between the
parent's constitutional rights and the state's parens patriae interest in
protecting the best interests of the child.2" 5 Key to this balancing test was
the degree of the abridgement of parental rights at issue.06 The
Washington Supreme Court had previously upheld the use of the state's
parens patriae power without requiring a showing of harm to the child in
In re Sumey, In re Key, and State v. Steinbach.2 7 However, in Smith, the
court rejected the Sumey balancing test and instead relied on U.S.
Supreme Court precedent to hold that the nonparental visitation statute
was facially unconstitutional because it relied on the "best-interest-of-
the-child" standard rather than the "harm-to-the-child" standard.2 8 The
Legislature should amend the nonparental visitation statute because the
Smith court misapplied its own precedent and misinterpreted U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in reaching its conclusion.
203. Id. at 2065-66 (Souter, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2070 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. See, e.g., In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 762-65, 621 P.2d 108, 110-12 (1980).
206. See id.
207. 101 Wash. 2d 460, 679 P.2d 369 (1984). For a discussion ofIn re Sumey and In re Key, see
supra Part I.B.
208. Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1,20, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998) af'd on other grounds
sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
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1. Washington Courts Consistently Utilized the Sumey Balancing Test
Before Smith
The Legislature should amend the nonparental visitation statute
because the Washington Supreme Court's position in Smith-absent a
threshold finding of parental unfitness or harm to the child, the state, as
parens patriae acting on the child's behalf, may not intrude on parental
rights, no matter how slightly-cannot be reconciled with existing case
law. The proposed amendments would reverse the Washington Supreme
Court's insistence in Smith that a showing of harm to the child or
parental unfitness is required before the state may exercise its parens
patriae power20 9 and restore the balancing test of Sumey. Without this
amendment, lower courts will have little guidance when determining
how to apply constitutionally the statute in the wake of Smith and Troxel.
In Sumey, the Washington Supreme Court contrasted temporary child
placement with termination of parental rights. 2 ° The Sumey court upheld
the placement of a child outside the home against the parent's wishes,
reasoning that the degree of intrusion on the parent's rights was
relatively minor because the parents retain custody over the child.21 The
substantial interests of the state and child were held sufficient to justify
the limited infringement on the parent's rights. 2 2 Key involved a
dependency proceeding, which the court held to be a more serious
interference with the parent-child relationship.2 3 Yet the Key court also
followed the Sumey test.214 In applying the Sumey best-interest-of-the-
child test, the court explicitly rejected a requirement that there be a
finding of parental unfitness or "harm to the child" in order to bring the
state'sparenspatriae power to bear.215
Occasional, temporary visitation by grandparents and others, allowed
only if it is in the best interest of the child, is a relatively minor
interference with parental rights. Such visitation is certainly less intrusive
than a dependency proceeding. Yet in Smith, the court required a
showing of harm prior to awarding visitation, while Key rejected such a
209. See id.
210. Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d at 762-65, 621 P.2d at 110-12.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. In re Welfare of Key, 19 Wash. 2d 600,602,836 P.2d 200,201 (1992).
214. Id. at 610-11, 836 P.2d at 205-06.
215. Id.
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requirement in a dependency proceeding. The ruling in Smith returns the
court to the common law paradox where it was easier to terminate rights
than it was to obtain visitation rights. 216 Thus, the amendment would
restore the Sumey test to balance parents' constitutional rights and states'
parens patriae power by reaffirming the best-interest-of-the-child
standard. The best-interest standard is the touchstone by which all other
rights are tested and concerns addressed in various contexts dealing with
children. 2 7 The decision by the Smith court calls into question all statutes
relying on the best-interest-of-the-child standard. 18 If this result were
allowed to stand, it would radically alter the long-standing basis by
which child welfare cases are determined and overturn what was well-
settled law.219 As Justice Stevens pointed out, child welfare cases do not
present simply a bipolar struggle between parents and the state: they also
implicate the interests of the child in question.220
2. The Smith Court Misapplied U.S. Supreme Court Precedent in
Striking Down the Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard
The Legislature should amend the nonparental visitation statute to
restore the best-interest-of-the-child balancing test of Sumey, correct the
216. See supra Part I.C.I.
217. See, e.g., Wash. State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 133
Wash. 2d 894, 923, 949 P.2d 1291, 1306 (1997) ("As in all matters dealing with the welfare of
children, the court must additionally act in the best interests of the child."); In re Marriage of
Littlefield, 133 Wash. 2d 39, 51-52, 940 P.2d 1362, 1368-69 (1997) (noting that in absence of
parental cooperation during post-separation action, trial court is given broad discretion to develop
and order parenting plan according to guidelines set forth in WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)
(2000) and based on best interests of children at time of trial); In re Aschauer, 93 Wash. 2d 689,695,
611 P.2d 1245, 1249 (1978) ("This court has repeatedly said that the goal of a dependency hearing is
to determine the welfare of the child and his best interests."); In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 738, 513
P.2d 831, 832 (1973) ("[A] child's welfare is the court's primary consideration ... when the rights
of parents and the welfare of their children are in conflict, the welfare of the minor children must
prevail."); State ex reL Campbell v. Cook, 86 Wash. App. 761, 770-71, 938 P.2d 345, 350-51
(1997) (noting that best interests of child are paramount in paternity proceedings; and upholding trial
court's denial of putative father's attempt to reopen and challenge paternity determination made
thirteen years prior).
218. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2068 n.5 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting ten
Washington statutes invoking best-interest standard and 698 judicial opinions referencing best-
interest standard).
219. Every state save Georgia predicates nonparental visitation on the best interest of the child
standard. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2078 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-3(c)
(1999)).
220. Id. at 2071 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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Smith court's misapplication of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and
ensure that Washington courts constitutionally apply the nonparental
visitation statute. The line of U.S. Supreme Court cases relied on in
Smith does not purport to eliminate the state's parens patriae power or
the best-interest-of-the-child standard. Instead these cases involve
substantial, rather than relatively minor, infiingements on parental rights
or other fundamental rights."'
The restoration of the Sumey best-interest-of-the-child balancing test
comports with parents' Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights in raising
their children. The Smith court cited Wisconsin v. Yoder for the
proposition that "the Supreme Court cases which support the
constitutional right to rear one's child and the right to family privacy
indicate that the state may interfere only if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a
potential for significant social burdens." 2 But this characterization goes
too far. Yoder turns on the free exercise claim asserted by the child's
Amish parents and the unique facts of that case.2" The Court held where
the interests of parents were combined with a free exercise of religion
claim of the nature present in that case, the state must show a compelling
interest in requiring Amish parents, contrary to their religious beliefs, to
send their children to school beyond the eighth grade.224 However, the
Yoder Court did not hold that harm is a threshold requirement for any
encroachment on parental rights,22 5 as the Smith court implied in its
rejection of the best-interest-of-the-child standard. 6
221. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982) (termination of parental rights);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (religious freedom); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645,646-47 (1972) (termination ofparental rights); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,530-34
(1925) (religious freedom); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (upbringing and
education of children).
222. Smith v. Stillwell-Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 969 P.2d 21, 27 al'd on other grounds sub
nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, the
cited case does not so hold. In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment barred the application of compulsory school attendance law to Old Order Amish
who did not send their children to school after the eighth grade because "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
223. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 18, 969 P.2d at 29.
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The Smith court further erred in concluding that in Prince v.
Massachusetts the U.S. Supreme Court required that some harm threaten
the child's welfare before the state could constitutionally interfere with a
parent's rights by exercising its parens patriae power.227 Although
Prince indicates state intervention in areas of religious practices or
parental control is appropriate to prevent harm to a child, that case does
not suggest harm to a child is a threshold requirement for any and all
types of state encroachment of parental rights. 228 Furthermore, Prince
was specifically limited to the facts of that case.229 Therefore, by
amending the statute to include the Sumey best-interest-of-the-child
standard, the Washington Legislature will ensure consistent application
of both Washington Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court parens
patriae and Fourteenth Amendment precedent.
E. The Proposed Amendments Encompass Modern Family Situations
and Provide Washington Courts with Familiar Tools for Applying
Washington's Nonparental Visitation Statute
As the purpose section would indicate,23 the proposed amendments
would also recognize the changing nature of modem families. They
would recognize that legal or biological relationships do not always
address the reality of modem family life and they would protect the
interests of those legally prohibited from establishing a legal relationship
with a child by permitting visitation outside of the traditional, strict
parental visitation rules.
The amended statute would further give flexibility to the trial courts in
fashioning visitation orders in cases presenting unique family structures.
Furthermore, the statute would provide needed guidance to the trial
courts because its language is familiar to trial courts. Because courts
have successfully applied these guidelines to nonparental visitation
during and after divorce proceedings,23' they could easily be adapted to
other nonparental visitation cases. The best-interest standard would
retain the flexibility required by trial courts in addressing the infinite
circumstances and possibilities that surround child welfare determi-
227. See id.
228. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
229. Id. at 170-71.
230. See supra Part III.A.3.
23 1. See supra Part I.C.2.
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nations such as the nonparental visitation at issue in these cases. 2 The
statute would also work to protect the relationships children develop with
adults who play significant roles in the lives of these children. The state
has a substantial interest in protecting children's significant relationships
with adults, promoting healthy family relationships, and reinforcing the
positive influences of significant relationships with relatives and de facto
parents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The nature of the family unit often includes adults other than
biological or legal parents who provide significant positive influences on
children. These benefits include stronger family bonds, moral instruction,
opportunities to observe healthy adult relationships, and additional
educational opportunities. Under ordinary circumstances, a child's
parents are best situated to determine the advisability of visitation with
their minor children by other adults. However, in some circumstances the
best interests of the child are better served by allowing visitation with
certain adults against the wishes of the child's parents.
States have recognized this reality by enacting nonparental visitation
statutes. By their very nature, these statutes represent a conflict between
a parent's constitutional rights to raise a child as he or she sees fit and the
state's parens patriae power. In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court
suggested that the Washington Legislature and Washington Supreme
Court failed to appropriately resolve this conflict in the statute and its
application. To address the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns and ensure
that courts constitutionally apply Washington's nonparental visitation
statute, the Legislature should make two amendments to the statute and
add a purpose section. The Legislature should both limit the class of
persons permitted to petition for visitation to relatives and de facto
parents, and codify a rebuttable presumption that a parent's decision
regarding visitation is in the best interest of the child. In addition to
232. See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996). While finding the Florida
grandparent visitation statute violated the state constitution, the Florida Supreme Court acknow-
ledged other states had upheld their grandparent visitation statutes against federal constitutional
challenges, noting: "[i]n those cases a best interest standard was deemed to be sufficient" Id. (citing
Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691 (Conn. 1990); Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989); Spradling v. Hanis, 778 P.2d 365 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.
1992); Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1995)).
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addressing the concerns of the U.S. Supreme Court, these amendments
would ensure that Washington courts properly apply Washington
Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Parents have rights
that must be respected. But children have a compelling interest in
developing relationships with other caring adults. The state should act to
protect all of these interests.
